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Wales and the Brexit Vote




1 Welsh voters, like people in Scotland, are now quite used to referendums as the one held
on 23 June 2016 on the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the European Union
was the fifth one to be held in the country since 1975. That year the first ever UK-wide
referendum was held on 5 June and British voters were asked whether they wanted to
stay in the European Community or if, after two years' membership, they wanted to leave
it. On that occasion, the Yes vote in Wales at 65%1 was slightly lower than the UK figure of
67%.  Subsequently Welsh voters were called to vote on 1 March 1979 on the Labour
government’s proposals for a devolution settlement. There was less appetite in Wales for
the proposed Welsh Assembly than there was in Scotland for the Parliament as it was
outlined at that time. Only 20.3% voted Yes (whereas in Scotland 58.9% voted in favour).
Nothing came of this, not even for Scotland, where the result failed to achieve the 40% of
the  electorate’s  approval  as  stipulated  in  the  Cunningham  amendment  to  the  1978
Scotland Act. Eighteen years later Wales voted again on 18 September 1997, a week after
Scotland had voted hugely in favour of the establishment of a Scottish Parliament (74.3%).
In Wales the result was more muted – 50.2% of the electorate participated and 50.3% of
the votes cast were in favour of setting up a Welsh Assembly. In 2011, Welsh voters faced
two referendums:  on 3  March they were asked to  pronounce on whether  the Welsh
assembly’s legislative powers should be extended, which they approved by 63.5% (turnout
35.6%); and on 5 May, they had their say on the Alternative Vote referendum. Nearly 68%
of UK voters rejected a change in the “First past the Post” British voting system whereas
in Wales (turnout 41.7%) this rejection was slightly less, at 65.5% of the votes. And then on
23 June 2016 came the fifth referendum, the second vote on membership of the European
Union. While the overall result for the UK (turnout 72.2%) was 51.9% who wished to leave
the EU, this figure was slightly amplified in Wales (turnout 71.7%) where, overall, the
result was 52.5 % in favour of quitting the EU as opposed to 47.5% who wished to stay.
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This result contrasted with the other devolved territories, for in Scotland 62% of voters
were in favour  of  the EU membership and in Northern Ireland this  figure was  56%.
However contrasting or comparing Wales with the other devolved territories is not valid
because of regional dimensions to inequality, because of their distinct political histories
and because of the asymmetrical nature of UK devolution. Just for the sake of clarity:
Wales represents 4.8% of the UK population (England 84%, Scotland 8.3% and Northern
Ireland 2.9%).
2 However, the major puzzle, as far as Wales is concerned, is why most Welsh voters voted
to leave the European Union when, since 1973, the country has received billions of euros
in EU funding for infrastructure and economic re-generation. Wales was to receive €1.8
billion  from  the  EU  between  2014-20  through  structural  funding  and  various
programmes. In addition to the guaranteed EU funds for Wales, supplements from other
EU funds are also available to Wales. These include the EU’s research and innovation
fund, Horizon 2020, funds for business and training, the ERASMUS programme, subsidies
for agriculture, fisheries among others and could be worth a total of £90bn.2
3 We will first examine the way that Welsh votes were distributed across the Principality
before looking at the reasons that incited voters to favour the "Leave" option. A brief
overview of the profile of "Brexiteers" will be followed by a conclusion that summarises
how the vote in Wales was in fact quite easy to predict.
 
Analysis of the geographical distribution of votes
4 In 1975 all the regions in Wales voted in favour of staying in the then Common Market
whereas in 2016 17 of the 22 regions voted to leave. The geographical distribution of these
votes provides a clue as to the reasons behind the vote. It has been fairly widely agreed
that across the United Kingdom urban areas with mixed, multicultural populations and
where there was a concentration of educated people voted in favour of the EU and this is
reflected in Wales.  In Cardiff,  the political and economic capital and home to several
universities and in the Vale of Glamorgan, just to the south, electors voted to remain,
although the proportions were different.  In Cardiff  the split  was quite wide (101,788
Remain; 67,816 Leave) whereas in the Vale of Glamorgan it was extremely narrow (36,681
/35,628).  This  would  then  confirm  the  UK-wide  trend  just  described.  A  third  area,
Monmouth, also voted narrowly for Remain (28,061 / 27,569) but the reasons here would
not be the same as for Cardiff. Monmouth is situated on the eastern border of Wales and
it has a history of being attached to England as well as to Wales, although its position was
not finally clarified until the Local Government Act of 1972 which placed it in Wales.
Monmouth  voters  have  mostly  always  elected  Conservative  MPs  and  the  current
Assembly Member (AM) is a Tory, so Monmouth could be said to have more of a split
identity  or  less  of  a  definitely  Welsh  one.  Identification  with  England  and  with  the
Conservative party would partly contribute to explaining the choice made by Monmouth
voters. However, this is the very opposite position to that of the other two regions in
Wales  which  voted  Remain:  Gwynedd  (35,517  /  25,665)  is  in  north-west  Wales  and
Ceredigion (21,711 / 18,031) extends from mid-Wales to the sea, between Cardigan and
Aberystwyth. What these two regions have in common is that they have the two highest
concentrations of Welsh speakers. They both return nationalist Plaid Cymru Assembly
Members (AMs) to the Welsh Assembly and have returned nationalist MPs to Westminster
too. These two areas have a very strong Welsh identity, underpinned by the language, and
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their choice to remain in Europe could maybe be compared to that of SNP supporters in
Scotland who saw a brighter future for Scotland within Europe and who were not swayed
by fears over immigration but who did believe that the UK economy would not flourish
outside of the European structure. However, the vote in Wales was not at all influenced by
desires for independence, unlike in Scotland. While support for independence for Wales
fell  to  a  low of  just  3% in September 2014 the 2016 referendum result  did give this
movement  something  of  a  boost.  A  substantial  minority,  28%,  were  found  to  have
announced support for Welsh independence if such a move should allow the UK to stay in
the EU.3 Even so, today, the question of independence for Wales is not a major factor in
the  policies  of  Plaid  Cymru which campaigns  rather  more  for  extended powers  and
greater  devolution.  Nevertheless,  Leanne  Wood,  the  party  leader,  stated  after  the
referendum  that  the  UK  needed  redesigning  and  if  all  four  home  nations  were
independent they could actually cooperate in a new way. She reinforced the idea that an
independent Wales could rejoin the EU.4 Yet, this does not sound like a winning policy
when the majority of Welsh voters expressed a desire to leave …
5 However these five regions were in the minority as the other 17 areas voted to leave the
EU and,  in  what  seemed to  be  a  paradox,  the  greatest  number  of  Leave  votes  were
registered in the very areas which have received the most EU support over the years.
Substantial  amounts  of  EU  subsidies  towards  structural  funding  and  social  projects
(European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) and European Social Funds (ESF)),5 have
been directed notably to the south Wales Valleys between Newport and Swansea and
these are the areas that voted in often quite large numbers to Leave: Blaenau Gwent,
Bridgend, Caerphilly, Merthyr Tydfil, Neath Port Talbot, Newport, Rhondda, Swansea and
Torfaen. These areas, which used to be characterised by heavy industry and mining, have
been among the hardest hit by the UK’s transition to a knowledge based, post-industrial
economy. The Leave vote was epitomised by the result in Ebbw Vale, former constituency
of Aneurin Bevan and Michael Foot, where unemployment is over 40% and where 62% of
those who took part in the referendum voted Leave, the highest percentage in Wales.6
 
Why did Wales vote Leave?
Media and political parties
6 The  fairly  widespread  surprise  at  the  “bizarrely  self-defeating”  result  in  Wales,  was
expressed and partially explained in an article published in The Guardian on 27 June 2016,
”Why did Wales shoot itself in the foot in this referendum?”7 The author, Richard Wyn Jones, is
a professor at the Wales School of Governance at the University of Cardiff. He does not
believe that the result was due to an old kind of self-loathing and a sense of inferiority
which he believes has died away. His historic reference to “the Welsh giving up on Wales”
relates  back  to  pre-devolution  attitudes  in  Wales,  before  the  creation  of  the  Welsh
Assembly in 1998 and before a growing confidence in a distinct Welsh identity began to
grow in the wake of the failures of the 1979 referendum. Professor Jones analyses the
Welsh vote firstly in terms of a failure of media coverage. Since the media in Wales are
depleted and insufficient, unlike in Scotland – there is no national Welsh newspaper for
example although there are television and radio channels –, the result is dominance by
English media and very little difference was made in those newspapers and television
programmes available in Wales about the specificity of Wales. The result was a similar
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referendum result to England. To this can be added a certain lassitude on the part of both
journalists and voters since the EU referendum came just five weeks after the elections to
the Assembly on 5 May. It is felt that covering these elections had led to a feeling of
political fatigue. 
7 However,  lacklustre  coverage  of  issues  by  the  media  is  only  one  of the  factors  that
combined to produce the Leave result in Wales. Regarding the EU referendum there was
also a failure by the major parties and the Welsh government for in Wales they were all
too distracted by internal politics to fully engage in the Remain campaign, although all
the parties, on paper, were unified in urging a Remain vote. No convincing arguments
were made by either Plaid or Labour, which retained power in the Assembly elections in
May, to persuade Welsh voters of the benefits of staying in the European Union, nor by
the Conservative party in Wales, whose leader campaigned for Leave. The Labour party in
particular must take responsibility for the Welsh result. While at UK level the Labour
party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn provided half-hearted and muted support
for EU membership, within Wales, where Labour have dominated the Assembly since its
inception,  according  to  R.  W.  Jones  Labour  and devolved  politicians  have  adopted  a
defensive and protective stance rather than proactive policies: “politicians in Wales are
better known for what they are against – austerity, Tory cuts –rather than what they are for”. So
the referendum message was very indistinct, non-combative and not well communicated.
8 But  had  it  been  clearer,  more  vigorous  and  better  disseminated,  would  campaign
messages  to  vote  Remain  have  been  perceived  differently  by  voters?  The  answer  is
probably “no” because other factors played a significant role in deciding how people
would use their vote.
 
Social factors
9 A report8 published by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation on 31 August 2016 identified the
link between poverty, low skills and lack of opportunities and the vote for Brexit. This
poll, like many others, found correlations between age, level of education and ethnicity
and the way people voted. Early investigations before the vote revealed that regions with
the  greatest  economic  dependence  on  the  EU  were more likely  to  vote  Leave  and
consequently the results of the referendum showed this to be true. The report concluded
firstly that growing inequality in the UK was an important factor in how people decided
to vote and that 
income and poverty  do matter.  Groups of  voters  who have been pushed to  the
margins of our society, live on low incomes and lack the skills that are required to
adapt and prosper amid a post-industrial  and global economy, were more likely
than others to endorse Brexit. 
10 Increasing marginalisation and the feeling of being left behind led people to reason that
things might be better, or at least not any worse, if the UK were to go it alone, outside
Europe.  This  marginalisation  is  increased  by  geographical  factors  since  those
communities which feel they are left behind are not the places where new investment
and new jobs are to be found. In the case of Wales, as elsewhere in the UK, the closure of
the coal mines and the steel works in the south has led to widespread unemployment and
continued high rates of worklessness. So it is difficult to compete for jobs with people in
other more favoured areas and who also have the skills that are required because those
areas are where employment will be created.
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11 However,  it  appears that  the biggest  divide is  not  geographical  or  income levels  but
rather  the  educational  level  attained  by  voters.  Support  for  Brexit  was  found to  be
significantly higher by people with only GCSE qualifications or less, and many polls found
that there was a correlation across the UK between the Brexit vote and areas with high
shares of people with no education.9 There is an acknowledged graduate gap in Wales, a
brain  drain  of  talent,  as  Wales  is  a  net  loser  of  graduates  each  year,  having  lower
retention rates  than the  other  devolved nations  in  terms  of  both  the  proportion of
students who remain to study, and the proportion of graduates who subsequently get jobs
within Wales. Leaving the country is associated with better jobs, higher earnings and
higher rates of self-employment.10
12 Regarding the generation gap, Wales reflected UK-wide tendencies over the age divide
with younger voters  opting to  Remain while  older  people  tended to vote for  Brexit.
However, while 67% of under-30s in Wales did vote to Remain, Wales only ranked 8th out
of  11  regions  for  under-30 support  for  staying in the EU thereby showing relatively
Eurosceptic  tendencies.11 Research  carried  out  by  the  Wales  Institute  of  Social  and
Economic Research Data and Methods (WISERD) at Cardiff University revealed that young
Welsh voters use social media less than others across the UK and potentially relied on
television and the press plus more face to face means for gaining information on the
referendum. This might well be explained by the patchy internet service provided across
Wales and the weak phone signals in many parts of the country. But this research also
showed that even if on the day young people had voted in the same proportions as over
65s (the group with the highest turnout), the final result of the referendum would not
have changed and the Leave vote would still have prevailed in Wales and across the UK.
So it would seem that in explaining the choice made by Wales generational divide does
not in fact apply and neither does the ethnic factor. 
13 Analysis of the referendum vote across the UK inevitably has to consider the impact of
Black,  Asian  and  minority  ethnic  (BAME)  votes  which  across  England  mostly  voted
Remain but these groups of voters had no impact on the Welsh result since 93.2% of the
population is white British (95.6% of the population is white). 
 
“Nothing to lose”
14 These academic findings, on income, skills and level of education were borne out in a BBC
programme broadcast a month after the vote12when reporters travelled to Ebbw Vale to
find out why in this area voters had rejected the European Union so massively (62%). As
in many other places in the UK, the issues of migrants and controlling British borders
were raised but again this pattern revealed that the areas of greatest immigrant concern
were areas where there are the least number of migrants. Deprivation in the Valleys was
partly blamed on migrants and Poles in particular who represented more competition for
jobs and who were accused of working for lower wages and for putting strain on local
infrastructures, such as schools, housing and hospitals. But these seemed to be more of an
identifiable target rather than an actual threat.
15 When questioned about EU support that had brought sports centres, new roads and town
centre renovation interviewees explained that none of this really made any difference to
their lives, that they felt like second class citizens in their own country and that they had
nothing to lose. There is a lack of recognition that EU funding has had any impact on
their lives and there was no connection to life experiences nor to tangible job creation.
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Job disappearances are what affects the area. For example, the Ebbw Vale Steelworks was
once the largest steelworks in Europe. The Anglo- Dutch owners, Corus, closed it in 2002
with a loss of 780 jobs; the Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Company, founded in 1780 and
employing 34,000 people at the turn of the 20th century, also closed in 2002, when it was
still the largest tinplate producer in Britain. Leave voters said in their TV interviews that
they felt “let down”. The paradox is symbolised by the Heads of the Valleys Road, the A465,
and the  section between Dowlais  Top and Tredegar  which was  recently  redeveloped
thanks to ERDF money. One interviewee remarked that it didn’t really serve his valley and
villages since it was “a nice bypass”, making it easier to avoid the area.
 
A predictable result
16 It is clear that there was or is a reality gap between the policies and pronouncements
from on high,  central  authorities,  whether they be the heads of political  parties,  the
Westminster government or the EU chiefs in Brussels and the electors in the polling
booths but the result of the referendum should not have been a surprise in the UK13 and
especially not in Wales since the results of the general election on 7 May 201514 and the
Welsh  Assembly  elections  on  5  May  201615 clearly  indicted  disaffection  with  the
Establishment and with the major political parties. Firstly, in the general election, the
British electoral system, known as “First past the post” (FPTP), produced rather skewed
results.  The  results  of  the  general  election  in  the  UK  produced  a  victory  for  the
Conservative party which won 331 seats with a majority of 12 in the House of Commons,
and this was based on having won 36.9% (or 11,334,92) of all the votes cast. However the
Scottish National Party moved into third place behind Labour by winning 56 seats on the
strength of 1,454,436 votes which was 4.7% of votes cast that day. Meanwhile, 3,881,129
people voted for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). This represented 12.6%
of the votes but only translated into one seat. As early as January 2013 David Cameron
proposed to hold a referendum on EU membership and it is widely acknowledged that
this was done in a bid to appease Tory voters who were defecting to UKIP. In Wales the
general election results saw UKIP make the biggest gains among the six leading parties
and it captured 13.6% of the vote although not enough in any constituency to win an MP.
However, almost a year later in the Welsh Assembly elections UKIP made a massive bound
forward in capturing 12.5% of the constituency votes, in the FPTP vote although again
this did not translate into any seats in the Senedd. Yet, in the regional vote where the
proportional representation method applies for the election of additional members in the
Welsh Assembly, UKIP secured 7 seats spread across the five electoral regions with an
average of 13.2% of the votes. This result is uniquely Welsh and is not reflected in results
in any of the other elected governing assemblies in the UK. 
17 Traditionally Wales always used to be a Labour stronghold but the Welsh Labour party is
losing its  appeal  and is  again running a  minority  administration in Cardiff.  The gap
between politicians and those they represent was characterised in Wales by the nature of
the Remain campaign which was first overshadowed by wrangling in the Assembly about
the post of First Minister which eventually went to Labour’s Carwyn Jones and then by
the fact that there was no credible or cohesive message on the part of Remainers. Many
leading Welsh politicians were on a different side to the voters in their areas including
Carwyn Jones (Bridgend),  Leanne Wood,  head of  Plaid (Rhondda) and Stephen Crabb,
Conservative Secretary for Wales (Pembrokeshire). Bizarrely, the same thing happened in
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the pro-Leave camp as the Conservative leader Andrew RT Davies was ignored (Vale of
Glamorgan) like David Davies in Monmouth. As stated earlier, this is being seen in terms
of are-ordering of electoral politics in Wales expressed not only in terms of the lack of
connection with the  political  leadership but  also  in  the  way people  feel.  The chasm
between voters and the political elite is reflected around the globe, as proved by the
support  for  Trump in America,  Syriza  in Greece,  Podemos in Spain,  and so on.  This
cumulative movement would therefore not seem to be just about the EU referendum but
more about disenfranchisement and exclusion. And when the opportunity came to vote in
a referendum with a clear Yes/ No choice,  people seized the chance to tell  the self-
appointed, distant elites what they thought. Voter turnout in Wales at 71.7% was higher
than it was for general election (65.6%) and the Welsh Assembly election (45.3%) proving
that interest in the EU question was high, whatever the reason. 
 
Conclusion
18 The fact that the UK’s different nations have voted in different ways contains the makings
of a constitutional crisis. It is unlikely that the devolution settlements will be unpicked
but the future of the UK is uncertain, inside the EU or outside, in terms of domestic
governance. There is talk of reunification in Ireland just as the notion of a “hard” border
is also being invoked. In Scotland many are now agitating for a second referendum on
independence  in  order  to  stay  in  the  European  Union.  For  Wales,  there  could  be
opportunity in that Brexit maybe offers a chance to negotiate and ask for more from
Westminster in terms of funding and devolved powers. The Wales Bill being debated in
the House of Lords (end of October 2016) is the chance to do just this and reframe the
relationship  between  Cardiff  Bay  and  Westminster  with  new  powers  over  energy,
transport and elections, among others being devolved to Cardiff. However, it is felt in
many quarters, among academics and politicians, that with the fractures exposed by the
EU referendum, this amendment of the Government of Wales Act 2006 is not a clear
enough piece of legislation and is too full of complexities and contradictions. The crux of
the matter was explained in the House of Lords second reading of the bill on 10 October
2016 by Lord Morgan of Aberdovey
(…) it would be very important to clear up all these issues before we have Brexit.
Brexit will have a major impact on Wales in almost every aspect: in agriculture,
education, industry, and almost every feature you can think of. It is crucial to have
constitutional clarity within the United Kingdom and between all its governmental
institutions before the iron curtain comes down.16
19 As  a  last  word,  four  months  after  the  fatal  vote  in  June  2016,  an ITV Wales/Cardiff
University YouGov poll17 found Welsh voters would vote Remain by 53% and Leave by 47%
if there was a second EU referendum, reflecting patterns seen across the UK. But the
constitutional  and  political  complexities  of  finding  some way  of  over-turning  or  re-
running the vote, means that these Bregrets may not count for much. 
20 Moya JONES is professor of British Studies at the University of Bordeaux Montaigne,
France.  A  graduate  of  the  LSE,  she  is  the  author  of  numerous  articles  and
publications  in  French  and  English,  focussing  on  centres  and  peripheries:
multicultural  Britain  and  the  new  constitutional  settlements  in  the  United
Kingdom. One of her particular areas of interest is Wales and Welsh studies.
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ABSTRACTS
On 23 June 2016 Wales, like England, voted to leave the European Union. This vote may seem
curious in the light of the fact that Wales has been the recipient of generous EU funding over the
past forty years. However, Welsh voters’ preference for an exit is possibly explained by a number
of  factors  which  highlight  Wales’s  distinctive  profile,  for  it  resembles  neither  Scotland  nor
Northern Ireland. These reasons include political  and social  patterns within Wales as well  as
party  politics  and  also  possible  failures  in  communication.  However,  the  Welsh  vote  was
predictable.
Tout comme l’Angleterre, le 23 juin 2016 le pays de Galles a voté en faveur d’une sortie de l’Union
européenne. Or, à première vue, ce choix serait difficile à comprendre car le pays de Galles a été
destinataire,  pendant  plus  de  quarante  ans,  de  fonds  en  provenance  de  l’UE.  Cependant,  un
certain nombre de facteurs auraient influencé la décision des Gallois. Parmi ces raisons on peut
nommer  la  spécificité  identitaire  du  pays,  ainsi  que  le  rôle  joué  par  différentes  formations
politiques. On peut pointer aussi un certain déficit de communication. Néanmoins, le résultat
gallois était prévisible.
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